Abstract: We study a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games, where players follow a behavioral rule called best-reply matching. Under this rule a player matches the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this strategy is a best reply. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a simple model of social learning, where newborns adopt a best-reply to recent observations of play. In this paper we analyze best-reply matching in more detail and illustrate the concept by means of well-known examples. E.g., in the centipede game it is shown that players will continue with large probability.
"Learning theory, on the one hand, and game theory (...), on the other, both purport to provide theories of 'rational' behavior. (...) It would be interesting, in order to gain a better understanding of the concepts of 'rationality' underlying these two bodies of theory, to construct a situation in which their predictions of behavior could be compared, and in which these predictions, in turn, could be compared with experimental data on actual behavior." -Herbert A. Simon (1957) 1 Introduction This paper studies a new equilibrium concept for finite n-player non-cooperative games, called best-reply matching equilibrium. In a best-reply matching equilibrium each player chooses a pure strategy with a probability equal to the probability that this pure strategy is a best reply to a pure strategy profile chosen by the opponents. The new concept is interesting for two reasons. First, as we show in this paper, it provides a possible solution to one of the most known puzzles in game theory: the centipede game. Second, as shown in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) best-reply matching equilibria naturally arise as stationary states in a simple learning model in non-cooperative games. While the result for the centipede game is interesting in itself, the learning model is our main motivation for studying the new equilibrium concept. Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) show that best-reply matching equilibria are stationary states in a social learning model where, following the standard framework, each player is represented by an infinite population of agents that are programmed to pure strategies. Every period a fraction of agents dies and is replaced by newborns. Social learning is driven by the assumption that newborns adopt a best-reply to the outcome of play that is observed in the last period. In case of multiple best replies each best reply is chosen equally likely. Alternatively, the learning process can be derived from a probabilistic learning model where players positively reinforce their best replies to the observed outcomes of play. ( We give a precise description of the learning model in Section 3.) Independent of the interpretation, the prediction for the learning model in finite time, and in particular cases also asymptotically, is best-reply matching equilibrium. Though the latter shares some features with Nash equilibrium, the two concepts typically differ from each other. The main purpose of this paper is therefore to study the new equilibrium concept in more detail. In particular, our results include the following:
• Existence. Every finite n-player non-cooperative game has at least one best-reply matching equilibrium (Proposition 3).
• Rationality. Best-reply matching equilibria survive iterated elimination of pure strategies that are never a best reply to any pure strategy profile of the opponents (Proposition 5). Furthermore, any pure strategy that receives positive weight in a best-reply matching equilibrium is rationalizable. However, the equilibrium mixed strategy may fail to be rationalizable.
• Structure. In two-player games every minimal curb set contains the support of a unique best-reply matching equilibrium. Consequently, the set of best-reply matching equilibria has dimension equal to the number of minimal curb sets minus one (Proposition 7).
Our result for the centipede game is as follows. Given in reduced normal form we show that the centipede game possesses a unique best-reply matching equilibrium, which has two basic features:
• each player continues with positive probability at every node but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes of the game,
• as the number of nodes goes to infinity the probability to stop at the first node, and in the same way to stop at any fixed node, converges to zero. This equilibrium prediction corresponds exactly to the observations made in laboratory experiments on the centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) , Nagel and Tang (1998) ), suggesting that best-reply matching equilibrium can be a powerful and predictive solution concept.
Our paper belongs to a growing area of research on learning and bounded rationality. Pioneering work in this field goes back to Simon (1957) who coined the term bounded rationality in contrast to the traditional model of full rationality. Since then many different views and ideas have been proposed for how to capture actual human economic behavior. See Selten (1991) and Aumann (1997) for illuminating discussions. Two research approaches are established by now. The first is to observe features of boundedly rational behavior in controlled laboratory experiments and develop new models that are able to explain these observations (e.g., Camerer (1997) , Rabin (1998) , Selten (1998)) . The second is to analyze models of learning and evolution in order to find out what forms of rationality possible procedures of individual and social learning can produce (e.g., Weibull (1995) , Vega-Redondo (1996) , Samuelson (1997) , Fudenberg and Levine (1998) , Young (1998) ). While some of these models focus on Nash equilibrium and possible refinements thereof, others lead to behavior that satisfies only weaker notions of rationality, like rationalizability. This paper is such an example.
Best-reply matching equilibrium considers a particular form of matching behavior. Generally, the term matching stands for the observation that an individual chooses an alternative from a given set of alternatives with a probability proportional to the value derived from that alternative. For example, suppose the individual has a finite set of alternatives S and v(s) ∈ R denotes the value of any alternative s ∈ S. Then matching means that s is chosen with probability equal to v(s)/ s∈S v(s). In our model of best-reply matching the individuals are the players in an n-player game, alternatives are given by the set of pure strategies of each player, and the value of each alternative is equal to the probability that this alternative is a best reply to the pure strategy profile chosen by the opponents.
Matching was first observed and analyzed in psychological studies of human learning, following the seminal paper of Estes (1950) . See Davison and McCarthy (1988) , Williams (1988) , Herrnstein (1997) , and Vulkan (2000) for recent collections and discussions of the findings. Whereas psychologists have concluded from these studies that the "generality of the matching relation has been confirmed by a large number of different experiments", and that " [a] pparently, the matching relation is a general law of choice" (Williams (1988, p178) ), economists have largely remained sceptical towards these observations. The typical argument put forward by economists is that matching will disappear as soon as individuals receive strong financial incentives, regular feedback, and extensive training. In a recent paper, Shanks and McCarthy (1999) have tried to challenge matching behavior building exactly on this argument. They provide individuals with a well-designed learning environment that includes proper incentives and possibilities for learning. While the authors do indeed observe that more subjects learn to behave rationally, they also find that about a third of the subjects persistently continue to match probabilities, "despite the fact that this lost them money" (Shanks and McCarthy (1999, p15) ).
We take from these studies that matching seems to be more than simply erratic and unstable behavior. Instead, it appears in so many settings and environments that we believe economists should not ignore the concept but rather develop a theoretical framework, which allows for both matching behavior and more rational types of behavior. Research that goes into that direction includes the work by Sarin (1997, 2000) and Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) . The present article builds on the latter and analyzes the resulting equilibrium behavior in more detail.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the class of games we consider in this paper. Section 3 formally defines the concept of best-reply matching equilibrium and provides an interpretation based on the learning model of Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) . Section 4 contains an analysis of best-reply matching equilibrium. The centipede game is studied in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Preliminaries
A non-cooperative game is a tuple G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, each player i ∈ N has a finite set S i of pure strategies, henceforth called actions, and a binary relation i over i∈N S i , reflecting his preferences over the outcomes. The binary relation i is assumed to be reflexive and its asymmetric part i , defined for all s, t ∈ i∈N S i by
is assumed to be acyclic. We also consider cases in which the preference relations i induce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u i : i∈N S i → R and denote the corresponding game by G = N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N . For notational convenience we write S = i∈N S i , S −i = j∈N\{i} S j . For an action tuple s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S we denote s −i = (s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n ) and, with a slight abuse of notation, s = (s i , s −i ). We denote by
the set of mixed strategies, henceforth called strategies, for player i. Analogously to the action case, we use notations ∆ = i∈N ∆ i ,
For a strategy profile σ −i , we write σ −i (s −i ) := j∈N \{i} σ j (s j ), the probability that the opponents of player i play action profile s −i ∈ S −i . We restrict attention to independent strategy profiles. Consider a game G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N . Denote for each player i ∈ N and each profile s −i ∈ S −i of actions of his opponents the set of pure best replies, i.e., the actions that player i cannot improve upon, by B i (s −i ):
Of course, for games N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N with utility functions we have:
Since S i is finite and i is acyclic, B i (s −i ) is nonempty. We call an action s i ∈ S i a never-best
with strict inequality for at least one s −i , and strictly dominated if all inequalities are strict. A strictly dominated action is clearly a never-best reply. We next define best-reply matching behavior and best-reply matching equilibrium.
Definition and Interpretation
Consider a game G = N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N and some player i ∈ N . To every action s i ∈ S i of player i we associate the set
of all action profiles of player i's opponents to which action s i is a best reply.
Note that we consider best-replies to action profiles and not to strategy profiles. In consequence, B −1 i (s i ) = ∅ if action s i is not a best reply to any profile of the opponents or if s i is a best reply to some mixed strategy profile only. Indeed, if players have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions much information may be ignored by focusing only on the above best-reply structure of the game. In particular, cardinal issues do not enter a player's consideration. Best-reply matching is an ordinal concept.
The term matching refers to the way how players use their beliefs about their opponents behavior to determine their own behavior, i.e. the strategy being played. We assume that additional to the information on the game each player i ∈ N has a belief about his opponents' behavior. This belief is given by a strategyσ −i ∈ ∆ −i determining for each action profile s −i ∈ S −i the probabilityσ −i (s −i ) with which player i believes that particular profile to occur. Best-reply matching says that a player builds his own strategy by matching his individual probability to play an action to the probability that this action is a best reply. We obtain the following definition.
Definition 1 Let G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N be a game. Consider a player i ∈ N. Let σ −i ∈ ∆ −i be the strategy profile player i believes his opponents to play. Player i matches best replies if for every s i ∈ S i :
Dividing by |B i (s −i )| in (1) we take care of multiple best replies and guarantee that σ i is indeed well-defined, i.e. probabilities sum up to one. Implicitly, it is thereby assumed that all multiple best replies are weighted equally. However, it should be clear that any other weighting rule would be fine too, although changing, of course, the probabilities assigned to actions. If best replies are unique the weighting rule is obviously irrelevant.
In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player matches best replies and beliefs are correct, i.e. for all i ∈ N,σ −i = σ −i .
Definition 2 Let G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N be a game. A mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆ is a best-reply matching (BRM) equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and for every s i ∈ S i :
The set of BRM equilibria of a game G is denoted by BRM(G).
We can give two possible interpretations of best-reply matching equilibrium. The first is a common static interpretation, where players are assumed to match best replies given their beliefs and beliefs are assumed to be correct. While this interpretation has the advantage of being simple it fails to explain why players should match best replies in the first place. Moreover, even if players match best replies it remains unclear why beliefs should be correct.
There exists, however, a second interpretation, which solves these problems in an elegant way by explicitly considering a social (or individual) learning process that leads players to best-reply matching given the observed behavior of the opponents. The learning process has been further explored in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) and is as follows.
Suppose there exist n infinitely large populations of agents, each corresponding to a particular player position in the underlying game G. Suppose furthermore that the game is repeated over infinitely many periods. In any period k ∈ N 0 each agent in population i ∈ N is programmed to some action s i ∈ S i . The fraction of agents in population i that are programmed to action s i in period k ∈ N 0 is denoted by σ k i (s i ). Each period k ∈ N 0 a fraction θ > 0 of agents in every population i ∈ N are randomly drawn to play the game G. Agents who are called to play the game are randomly matched in n-tuples such that each agent is matched with exactly one agent from every other population. After all n-tuples of agents have played the game these agents leave the system and are replaced by new agents. New agents choose their action by sampling exactly one outcome of play from the last period and adopting a best-reply to this outcome. In case of multiple best-replies new agents adopt each best-reply with equal probability.
More precisely, suppose that new agents who enter the system in period k sample the action profile s ∈ S. Then each agent who replaces an agent exiting population i chooses a best reply to the action profile s −i ∈ S −i , with multiple best-replies being chosen equally likely. In consequence, in period k+1 the fraction of agents in population i being programmed to action s i is equal to
We thus obtain the following adjustment rule.
Equation (3) defines a social learning process that is a discrete-time Markov process with infinite state space ∆.
Instead of considering a model of social learning, it is easy to see that adjustment rule (3) can also be derived from a probabilistic learning model of n players repeatedly playing the game G. In this model each player's behavior at time k is characterized by some strategy σ k i , i ∈ N. After realization of action profile s every player reinforces each of his best replies to the observed strategy profile by
. Similar to other models of reinforcement learning (e.g. Roth and Erev (1995) , Erev and Roth (1998) , Camerer and Ho (1999) , Börgers and Sarin (1997) ) players positively reinforce "good" actions and negatively reinforce "bad" actions. However, while in the standard model an action is "good" if it leads to a high payoff in this model an action is "good" if it is a best reply to a recent observation.
A detailed analysis of the Markov process defined by adjustment rule (3) is contained in Kosfeld, Droste, and Voorneveld (2001) . There it is shown that, if one approximates the learning process by a dynamical system of deterministic differential equations that follows the expected movement of the learning process, the steady states of the dynamical system are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria of the game G. The dynamical system serves as a good approximation for the behavior of the Markov process in finite time. In finite two player games the set BRM(G) is asymptotically stable and each equilibrium is Lyapunov stable. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the Markov process it is shown that (i) the process converges to the (faces of the) minimal curb sets of G with probability one, and (ii) absorbing states, if they exist, are best-reply matching equilibria of G. Moreover, best-reply matching equilibria are contained in the (faces of the) minimal curb sets of G.
Overall, the prediction for the learning rule (3) leads -both in finite time and in some cases also asymptotically -to best-reply matching equilibrium. As we will see, while in some cases best-reply matching equilibria can well be Nash equilibria of the game G, in general the two concepts differ substantially from each other. We now come to the analysis of the new equilibrium concept.
Analysis
A fundamental question with respect to any equilibrium concept concerns its existence. The first proposition shows that BRM equilibria exist for every game.
Proof. Let i ∈ N, σ ∈ ∆, and s i ∈ S i . Define, analogous to (2):
Applying the Brouwer fixed-point theorem to the function r : ∆ → ∆ that assigns to each σ ∈ ∆ the mixed strategy profile r(σ) ∈ ∆ with r(σ) i (s i ) := r i (s i , σ −i ) for each i ∈ N and s i ∈ S i , there is a σ * ∈ ∆ such that σ * = r(σ * ), which is a BRM equilibrium.
Remark 4 Notice that
for each σ ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N . As a consequence, when computing BRM equilibria, one of the conditions σ i (s i ) = r i (s i , σ −i ) of each player i is redundant.
A game H is said to be obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies from a game G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N if there exists a number k ∈ N of elimination rounds and for each player i ∈ N a collection of sets S 
H is the game N, (S
5. In the game H, no player i ∈ N has never-best replies.
The next proposition indicates the robustness of best-reply matching equilibria with respect to the (iterated) elimination of never-best replies.
Proposition 5
The following results hold:
(i) In a BRM equilibrium σ * of a game N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N never-best replies are played with zero probability.
(ii) The set of BRM equilibria of a game G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N equals -up to zero probability assigned to eliminated actions -the set of BRM equilibria of a game that is obtained by iterated elimination of never-best replies.
(iii) Let G = N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N be a game with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and let σ * be a BRM equilibrium of G. If player i's action s i is weakly dominated by the strategy σ i , then:
Proof. The proof of (i) is easy: if s i ∈ S i is a never-best reply, then the set B To prove (ii), it suffices to prove that the first round of eliminations does not change the equilibrium set, since the proof can then be repeated for the additional rounds. Assume for simplicity that in this first elimination round we eliminate all the never-best replies NB i := {s i ∈ S i | s i is a never-best reply of player i in G} of each player i ∈ N , thus obtaining a smaller game G . The equilibrium conditions in the game G are that for each i ∈ N and each s i ∈ S i :
By (i), actions s j ∈ NB j are played with zero probability in a BRM equilibrium. Hence the second sum in the last equality above equals zero. What remains, for each player i ∈ N and each action s i ∈ S i \ NB i , are exactly the equilibrium conditions for the game G . To prove (iii), we show that for each s i ∈ S i with σ i (s i ) > 0 it holds that
Let s −i ∈ B −1 i (s i ). Since σ i weakly dominates s i and s i ∈ B i (s −i ), the mixed strategy σ * i is a best reply to s −i , so for every s i ∈ S i with σ i (s i ) > 0 it must be that s i ∈ B i (s −i ), proving (4). Together with the definition of r i (·, σ * −i ) this implies the result:
The result above does not rule out that weakly dominated actions are played with positive, even quite large probability. Consider the game in Figure 1 . T weakly dominates B and L strictly dominates R. Both, T and B are a best reply against L, and T is a unique best reply against R. 
The condition for σ 1 (B) is redundant, since probabilities add up to one (Remark 4). Similarly, for player 2 we see that L is a unique best reply to both T and B, so that his equilibrium condition becomes σ 2 (L) = σ 1 (T ) + σ 1 (B).
Solving these equations and taking into account that (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ ∆ 1 × ∆ 2 we find that the unique BRM equilibrium equals ((
), (1, 0)). Observe that the weakly dominated action is not only played with positive probability, but that there is not even an alternative action with a higher probability. The results with respect to the iterated elimination of never-best replies in Proposition 5 call to mind the notion of rationalizability introduced in Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) . Without going into the formal definitions, it follows immediately from Proposition 5 and Bernheim (1984 ) that every action that is played with positive probability in a BRM equilibrium is rationalizable. However, in a BRM equilibrium σ, the mixed strategies σ i themselves need not be rationalizable. Consider for example the game in Figure 2 . In the unique BRM equilibrium of the game, (( , 0)), the mixed strategy of player 2 is strictly dominated by R. This shows that best-reply matching equilibrium is consistent with rationality on the action level but may conflict with rationality on the level of mixed strategies. Figure 2 indicates also that, despite the relatively prudent behavior with respect to (weakly) dominated actions as expressed in Proposition 5, the set of BRM equilibria and Nash equilibria have no obvious relation. In the Nash equilibria of the game in Figure 2 player one chooses T with probability p ∈ [ ] and player two chooses R with probability one, while the unique BRM equilibrium equals (( , 0)). It is, however, possible to indicate a relation with the notion of strict equilibria, introduced by Harsanyi (1973) as those strategy profiles σ satisfying the condition that each player plays his unique best reply to the strategies of the opponent:
It is clear that a strict Nash equilibrium is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and (consequently) that strict Nash equilibria do not always exist. However, if they exist, they are exactly the pure strategy BRM equilibria of the game.
Proposition 6
The set of strict Nash equilibria of a game N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N coincides with the set of pure strategy BRM equilibria.
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader.
From Proposition 6 it follows that a game can have more than one BRM equilibrium. A typical example for such a case is a coordination game. A two-player game is a coordination game if both players have the same set of actions and the unique best reply to an action of the opponent is to play the same action. Figure 3 shows a well-known example of a coordination game: the Battle of the Sexes. Obviously, in a coordination game a profile of strategies is a BRM equilibrium if and only if both players play the same mixed strategy. This illustrates an important difference from the Nash equilibrium concept. The pure Nash equilibria of a coordination game are the combinations of pure strategies in which the players indeed coordinate (choose the same pure strategy). Since these Nash equilibria are strict, they are also BRM equilibria. However, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players do not coordinate exactly. In the example above, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (( )). This equilibrium is not a BRM equilibrium, since it is not symmetric. For example, player 1 puts more probability on boxing than he believes player 2 does, which is not in accordance with matching. Intuitively, in a BRM equilibrium in order to avoid miscoordination players want to do exactly the same as their opponent. If the opponent chooses boxing with probability p they will choose boxing with the same probability.
The coordination game example shows that the set of BRM equilibria can be quite large. More information about the size and structure of this set is therefore of interest.
With respect to Nash equilibrium it is known that in two-player games the set of Nash equilibria has a nice decomposition into a finite number of polytopes (see, e.g., Winkels (1979) and Jansen (1981) ). Concerning the structure of the set of best-reply matching equilibria, we see that if the game G has only two players, then BRM (G) is a polytope, since the set of BRM equilibria is then determined by finitely many linear equations and linear weak inequalities in the variables (σ i (s i )) i∈N,s i ∈S i . If the game has at least three players, its set of BRM equilibria is determined by a set of polynomial equations over a Cartesian product of simplices. This leads to the observations that -analogous to the set of Nash equilibriathe set of BRM equilibria may be curved or disconnected. See Voorneveld (1999, pp207-209) for examples.
In general, the size of an equilibrium set is a measure of the cutting power of an equilibrium concept: if an equilibrium set contains many candidates, it can be seen as a weak concept, not ruling out many strategy profiles. With respect to the size of the set of BRM equilibria of a game N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N , remark that it is always a strict subset of ∆. A strategy tuple σ −i ∈ ∆ −i completely determines r i (·, σ −i ) (see Proposition 3) and hence in an n-player game it suffices to know only n − 1 components of a BRM equilibrium to compute the equilibrium strategy for the remaining n-th player. This implies that BRM(G) is always of lower dimension than ∆. In particular, it is impossible that BRM(G) = ∆.
For a two-player game G, the dimension of the polytope BRM(G) is related to the number of minimal curb sets in the game.
1 Curb sets were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) .
In our set-up they can be defined as follows. Fix a game G = N,
A curb set of G is a product set C = i∈N C i with C i ⊆ S i nonempty for each i ∈ N and B(C) ⊆ C. In other words, a curb set is a nonempty product set C of actions, containing all best replies against action profiles in the set C itself. A curb set is minimal if it does not properly contain an other curb set. Let C(G) denote the collection of minimal curb sets of G. Since S = i∈N S i is a curb set and there are only finitely many curb sets because S is finite, it follows that C(G) = ∅. Let G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N be a two-player game. For convenience, write S 1 = {e 1 , . . . , e m } and S 2 = {f 1 , . . . , f n }. By (2), a BRM equilibrium σ of G satisfies:
if e i is a best reply against action f j of player 2, and a ij = 0 otherwise. The numbers b ji are defined analogously. Regarding σ as an element of R |S1|+|S2| = R m+n and switching to matrix notation, this means that σ = Mσ, where
So σ is a fixed point of M. Since the columns of M add up to one, its transpose M T is a stochastic matrix and can be considered as the transition matrix of a (finite state, discrete time) Markov process. In this Markov process, the states are the m + n actions in S 1 ∪ S 2 and two states communicate with each other if and only if there is a sequence of best replies connecting each of these two states with the other. Hence, a communicating class (an equivalence class with respect to the communication relation) corresponds with a minimal curb set and the matrix M T is irreducible if and only if the entire strategy space is a minimal curb set. Notice, moreover, that the communicating classes (corresponding with the minimal curb sets) are recurrent: once the process enters a communicating class, it will never leave it. Since a BRM equilibrium satisfies σ = M σ, it corresponds (up to normalization, since the m + n coordinates of the vector σ ∈ ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) add up to two instead of one) with an invariant distribution of the Markov process. This prepares us for the following result.
Proposition 7 Let G = N, (S i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N be a two-player game.
(i) Every minimal curb set C ∈ C(G) contains the support of a unique BRM equilibrium of G.
(ii) The dimension of the polytope BRM (G) equals |C(G)| − 1.
by restricting attention to the strategy sets (C i ) i∈N is irreducible, since its strategy space C is a minimal curb set. Consequently, the associated Markov process has a unique stationary distribution. Since every BRM equilibrium, after normalization, gives rise to an invariant distribution of M T , the BRM equilibrium σ * of H, which exists by Proposition 3, must be unique. Since C is closed under rational behavior, σ * is also a BRM equilibrium of G.
(ii): The invariant distributions of the stochastic matrix M T associated with the game G are convex combinations of the extreme invariant distributions corresponding with the recurrent communicating classes of the Markov process (cf. Karlin and Taylor (1975) ). The recurrent communicating classes correspond with the |C(G)| minimal curb sets of the game, which each contain the support of a unique BRM equilibrium by part (i) of the proposition, so the polytope BRM(G) has |C(G)| extreme points and consequently dimension |C(G)| − 1.
Centipede game
The BRM equilibrium concept can be applied to the reduced strategic form of an extensive form game. This section discusses a T -choice centipede game. In the T -choice centipede game, introduced by Rosenthal (1981) , players 1 and 2 alternately move. In any of the 2T periods, the player whose turn it is to move can decide to stop the game (S) or to continue (C). Consequently, both players have T + 1 actions: stopping at any one of the T opportunities, or continue all the time. The game ends if one of the players decides to stop or if neither player has decided to do so after each of them has had T opportunities. For each player, the outcome when he stops the game in period t is better than that in which the other player stops the game in period t + 1 (or the game ends), but worse than any outcome that is reached if in period t + 1 the other player continues. Therefore:
Player 2's action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to the following actions of player 1:
• player 1 stops immediately; then all of player 2's T + 1 actions are a best reply;
• if k = T the unique best reply to player 1's choice to continue always is to stop at the final stage;
• player 1 decides to stop at opportunity k + 1.
Player 1's action to stop at his k-th opportunity is a best reply to exactly one action of player 2:
• player 2 decides to stop in the next period, at his k-th opportunity.
An example of a 3-choice centipede game is given in Figure 4 . Denote by p i [q i ] the probability of player 1[2] to stop at his i-th opportunity, once this opportunity is reached (i = 1, . . . , T ). Thus, our computations are in behavioral, rather than in mixed strategies. We show below that the unique BRM equilibrium satisfies for each number T ∈ N of choices and each k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}:
In particular, if the number of choices T approaches infinity, the probability for each player to stop at the first (and by the same argument at any finite) opportunity, converges to zero. The solution in (5) indicates that players continue with positive probability at every node, but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes in the game. This feature is mentioned as the most obvious and consistent pattern in the experimental study of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) , who remark that "any model to explain the data should capture this basic feature" (McKelvey and Palfrey (1992, p809) ). Thus, while no standard game theoretic solution concept can predict this outcome, the best-reply matching equilibrium concept does a good job. Moreover, the surprising result that a player continues with positive probability at his final node, even though this action is strictly dominated by stopping at that node, is observed in the experimental sessions of McKelvey and Palfrey as well. Nagel and Tang (1998) , in an experimental analysis of the centipede game in normal form, observe the same behavioral patterns as McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) .
We now prove equation (5). The description of the T -choice centipede game in terms of best replies (emphasized above) immediately gives rise to the following conditions for player 1:
p 1 = q 1 (I.1)
(1 − p 1 )p 2 = (1 − q 1 )q 2 (I.2)
· · ·
(1 − p 1 )(1 − p 2 ) · · · (1 − p T −1 )p T = (1 − q 1 )(1 − q 2 ) · · · (1 − q T −1 )q T , (I.T) and for player 2: q 1 = p 1 T + 1 + (1 − p 1 )p 2 (II.1)
(1 − q 1 )q 2 = p 1 T + 1 + (1 − p 1 )(1 − p 2 )p 3 (II.2)
The conditions that arise from always continuing are redundant (see Remark 4). We prove first of all, that in the T -choice centipede game we have for each i = 1, . . . , T −1:
This is necessary to avoid division by zero when we solve the game. We know from condition (I.1) that p 1 = q 1 . Suppose p 1 = 1. Substitution in (II.1) yields 1 = 1 T +1
, a contradiction.
Suppose p 1 = 0. Then p 2 = q 2 by (I.2) and p 2 = 0 by (II.1). Hence p 3 = q 3 by (I.3) and
Conclusion
Best-reply matching behavior induces a new equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games. In this paper we showed that every finite n-player non-cooperative game possesses at least one best-reply matching equilibrium and that in two-player games best-reply matching equilibria are uniquely contained in the faces of the minimal curb sets of the game. Pure strategies that receive positive weight in a best-reply matching equilibrium are rationalizable but the equilibrium mixed strategy may fail to be rationalizable.
We proved that the reduced normal form of the centipede game has a unique best-reply matching equilibrium, where each player continues with positive probability at every node but the probability to stop increases as players reach further nodes of the game. Moreover, as the number of nodes goes to infinity the probability to stop at any fixed node converges to zero. This prediction coincides with experimental evidence, suggesting that best-reply matching can be a powerful solution concept.
Several potential issues for future work remain. For example, more empirical evidence is needed to determine the extent to which matching behavior actually occurs in normal-form games. Another direction is to make the concept applicable directly to games in extensive form, without seeking recourse to the reduced normal-form game, as was done in Section 5. Finally, the development of a cardinal equilibrium concept presents a path worth to be taken. So far best-reply matching equilibrium is an ordinal concept: players only need to know the best-reply structure of the game, which makes the concept applicable to a wide class of games. It would be interesting to consider cardinal equilibrium concepts based on the matching principle in games where the players have clearly specified von-NeumannMorgenstern utility functions.
